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SUMMARY 
What are the implications of a renegotiated NAFTA for Canadian dairy producers? 
Many observers dread the prospect of even the slightest liberalization in the 
dairy sector. This paper takes a different perspective, arguing that opening 
Canada’s dairy sector would come with benefits not just for consumers, which is 
undeniable, but could also transform the industry and lead to a more productive 
dairy sector in Canada. 
Canadian dairy producers have been protected domestically through supply 
management and internationally through import-restricting border controls for 
over 40 years. This combination of domestic and foreign policies keeps Canadian 
dairy prices artificially high and allows producers to gain enormously from the 
system while hitting dairy consumers directly in the pocketbook. These policies 
are extremely costly for Canadian consumers and benefit the protected domestic 
dairy producers. Canadian international trade policies result in 200-percent 
tariffs on imports of many dairy products and almost 300-percent tariffs on over-
quota imports of cheese. The OECD estimates that from 2010 to 2016, Canadian 
trade policy with respect to dairy and the “supply management system” annually 
transfers over US$2.9 billion from Canadian consumers and taxpayers to milk 
producers. This is extremely expensive for Canadian consumers and this transfer 
to Canadian dairy producers underscores why our trade partners have focused 
on the exorbitant tariffs that support this system. We argue that it is not only 
consumers that are hurt by the status quo, but that the industry itself can evolve 
and thrive from increased competition. According to standard trade theory, 
liberalizing trade in an industry like this leads the least productive producers to 
exit the industry as the most-productive producers increase market share and 
expand. These dynamics generate a more competitive and productive industry. 
We present evidence that these dynamics played out in Canada following the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the North American Free 
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1Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and also in liberalized dairy industries in New Zealand and 
Australia. We argue that the massive economic rents earned by dairy producers in the 
essentially closed Canadian dairy sector means there is little competition in the industry, 
which has stifled growth and innovation in the sector. Liberalizing international trade 
in dairy will turn this around, increase competition in the industry and lead to a more 
productive and internationally competitive Canadian dairy sector while reducing the 
high cost of dairy faced by Canadian consumers. Liberalizing dairy will also be a strong 
signal to our trading partners that we are prepared to expend domestic political capital 
to improve NAFTA or other trade agreements.
It has become clear that our trading partners have lost patience with our protectionist 
trade policies with respect to dairy. Multinational organizations such as the WTO have 
also highlighted the problems that these policies pose. Canada is feeling pressure to 
reform the system from trading partners who are hurt by supply management policies. 
Eliminating trade restrictions in the supply management sector would go a long way 
toward appeasing our trade partners and fulfilling our international commitments. 
Supply management policies are in violation of the spirit and, arguably, the letter of 
law in international trade agreements. In the recent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
negotiations, Canada agreed to increase foreign access to its dairy market over a period 
of time by an estimated 3.25 per cent of its yearly milk production. This was a step in the 
right direction toward more competition in the sector. Canada should continue to push 
for reform in the dairy sector along the lines agreed to under TPP — but push even harder 
in the renegotiation of NAFTA.
Unfortunately, Canadian politicians of all stripes have found that fixing supply 
management is a non-starter politically, with the powerful supply management lobby 
being such an effective lobby group. The TPP agreement provided the right opportunity 
to open the dairy industry. This is obviously good for Canadian consumers but will hurt 
some Canadian dairy producers. The negative impact on the politically sensitive dairy 
producers, primarily in southern Ontario and Quebec, has left the level of protection in 
the industry largely untouched for decades.
Although some dairy producers will be hurt by opening the sector, the industry overall 
will thrive and become globally competitive. As demonstrated in the empirical literature 
of trade reform, and as we have observed in other Canadian industries that liberalized 
under CUSFTA and NAFTA, inefficient producers will close shop and more-productive 
producers will expand and prosper. The dairy trade liberalization that Canada agreed to 
under TPP should be the beginning and the NAFTA renegotiations are an opportunity for 
Canada to step up and do the right thing with respect to international trade in dairy while 
giving the Americans something they want in the negotiations. At the same time, it is an 
opportunity to weaken supply management and move toward dismantling it altogether.
2INTRODUCTION
During the most recent U.S. presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump embraced 
protectionist trade rhetoric. He promised to pull out of the recently signed Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), negotiated between 12 countries including Canada, and was extremely 
critical of NAFTA throughout the campaign, famously calling it the worst trade agreement 
ever signed. Although free trade is often a rhetorical casualty of presidential elections, once 
in office, presidents typically take a more pragmatic and forward-looking approach to trade 
policy. However, President Trump wasted no time in pulling out of TPP and continued to 
be critical of NAFTA. Although he expressed strong interest in terminating NAFTA, he 
eventually changed his mind (again) and is now willing to renegotiate the historic agreement.1 
Not only has President Trump been extremely critical of NAFTA, he has been openly critical 
of the protection that Canada provides its dairy farmers.2 On April 25, 2017, he tweeted that 
“Canada has made business for our dairy farmers in Wisconsin and other border states very 
difficult. We will not stand for this. Watch!”
 
From a Canadian perspective, federal and provincial governments began working on the 
NAFTA files right after the U.S. election. The renegotiation of NAFTA has important 
and potentially profound effects on the Canadian economy. On May 18, 2017, U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert Lighthizer wrote to inform Congress that the administration 
would initiate NAFTA negotiations with Canada and Mexico. According to the U.S. 
trade representative’s website: “On May 18, 2017, following consultations with relevant 
Congressional committees, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer informed Congress 
that the President intends to commence negotiations with Canada and Mexico with respect 
to the NAFTA. Through these negotiations, the United States seeks to support higher-paying 
jobs in the United States and to grow the U.S. economy by improving U.S. opportunities to 
trade with Canada and Mexico.”3 In his July 17, 2017 letter to Congress that spells out the 
administration’s objectives under NAFTA renegotiations, Lighthizer specifically identified 
1 
See Jeff Mason and David Lawder, “Trump says was ‘psyched to terminate NAFTA’ but reconsidered,” Reuters, April 
26, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-nafta-idUSKBN17S2DG. While this may be a negotiation tactic, 
President Trump has repeatedly threatened to pull out of NAFTA even after negotiations to improve NAFTA were 
initiated in August 2017. See Adrian Morrow, “Could Trump really pull the U.S. out of NAFTA?” The Globe and Mail, 
August 29, 2017, https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/us-politics/could-trump-really-pull-the-us-out-of-nafta/
article36111184/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&.
2 
Reported in Greg Price, “Trump Could Pull U.S. Out Of Nafta with Executive Order,” Newsweek, April 26, 2017,  
http://www.newsweek.com/nafta-trump-executive-order-590367.
3 See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta.
3the supply management practices as subject of negotiations.4 The document states that an 
objective will be to “Seek to eliminate non-tariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports including 
discriminatory barriers, restrictive administration of tariff rate quotas (and) other unjustified 
measures that unfairly limit access to markets for U.S. goods, such as cross subsidization, 
price discrimination, and price undercutting.” That is, the U.S. seeks to dismantle Canada’s 
protectionist supply management policies.
It is not only the Trump administration that is fed up with Canada’s dairy policies.5 The 
supply management sectors in Canadian agriculture (dairy and poultry) are shining examples 
of significant implicit subsidization and protection. Canada employs protectionist trade 
policy to sustain a domestic supply management program in these sectors. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has often commented on how this trade protection violates the spirit of 
membership in the organization and points out that this is a place where Canada is indeed 
extremely protectionist. Canada’s trade protection in these sectors has been an irritant for some 
of Canada’s trading partners and reducing the trade barriers became a condition for Canada to 
join negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Some observers saw the TPP as an opportunity for Canada to step up and do the right thing 
with respect to dairy. The prospect of eliminating supply management in Canada has become 
a daunting political challenge and no political party in Canada has been able to move forward 
with that agenda even though Canadian consumers would benefit from such a policy change. 
However, the TPP offered an opportunity to reduce trade barriers, thereby weakening supply 
management and providing at least a small step toward eliminating it altogether. The politically 
powerful supply management lobby was up in arms, but reducing trade barriers in this area 
became politically feasible because not only would consumers gain from a move toward 
dismantling supply management, but Canadian producers would generally gain from the 
market access afforded by TPP. 
The dairy and poultry producers would have to compete in a more liberalized trading 
environment, but we argue in this paper that the productive producers would benefit from 
access to a world market for their goods. Canada is a relatively small market and producers 
could benefit from a more global focus. 
Canadian dairy producers have been afforded the luxury of administered pricing and guaranteed 
revenue through supply management, as well as border controls to limit competing imports 
since 1971.6 This combination of domestic economic and international trade policies has kept 
Canadian dairy prices artificially high and has allowed some relatively inefficient producers to 
remain in the market while marginal consumers are priced out. (Slade and Hailu, 2016) 
Slade and Hailu (2016) provide direct evidence of the competiveness impact in the dairy sector 
when they compare productivity differences between Ontario and New York dairy producers. 
Controlling for producer characteristics, they find that producers operating in less-competitive 
Ontario are less productive than observationally equivalent producers in New York, where 
4 
Office of The United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of The President, “Summary of Objectives for the 
NAFTA Renegotiation,” July 17, 2017. 
5 
For the purpose of this study, the dairy industry is defined as those products identified within milk, cream and milk 
products (excluding butter and cheese), butter and other fats and oils derived from milk, and cheese and curd.
6 
For a detailed background discussion of the quota system in Canada’s dairy industry and its political rational, See  
Findlay (2012).
4the industry is competitive. The type of protection provided to Canadian dairy producers not 
only creates a disincentive for innovation and investment, but it also directly harms consumers 
and secondary producers by creating incentives for rent-seeking activities such as lobbying. 
Another more tacit problem specifically associated with protection in this industry is that 
it transfers wealth away from non-agricultural regions, as well as away from lower-income 
families, which traditionally spend a higher proportion of their income on food. It is estimated 
that on average, supply management costs a Canadian family $444 per year. (Cardwell, Lawley 
and Xianget, 2015).
Over the past three decades, Canada has signed 12 free-trade agreements (FTAs), some 
of which have significantly changed the economic landscapes of their member countries. 
Notably, the 1994 NAFTA between Canada, the United States and Mexico, the TPP between 
Canada and several other large economies in the Pacific region, and the 2016 Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union. In all FTA 
negotiations, some form of unilateral or bilateral liberalization of trade is a necessary ingredient 
for successfully coming to terms. What does this mean for the Canadian dairy sector? This 
paper focuses on the dairy sector in major dairy-exporting countries and examines the potential 
consequences from liberalizing trade in the Canadian dairy sector under NAFTA renegotiations. 
Several developed countries have liberalized their dairy industries and have benefited 
tremendously from greater exports and investment in dairy, as economic theory predicts.
Our discussion proceeds as follows: First, we provide an overview of government support for 
the dairy industry in Canada. We then provide some background information on the dairy 
industry under NAFTA and in North America, as the NAFTA renegotiation is top of mind. We 
then consider the possible impact of liberalizing trade in dairy by considering the liberalization 
experience of New Zealand and Australia. We show that the dairy industry in these countries 
benefited from dairy trade liberalization and examine the impact of the restrictive trade 
policy on the Canadian dairy industry and consumer. We conclude with an analysis of the 
consequence of a renegotiated NAFTA for the Canadian dairy industry.
SUPPLY MANAGEMENT IN CANADIAN DAIRY
There is significant variation across countries in the type and the level of government support 
provided to the dairy industry. Dairy support typically consists of purchasing surplus dairy 
produce, artificially controlling dairy prices and direct payment and marketing loans for 
producers. In Canada, the government’s involvement in the dairy industry began as early as 
the 1900s. Over the course of the last century, government involvement evolved into outright 
government intervention. After a spell of severely low dairy prices in the 1970s, the National 
Milk Marketing Plan (NMMP) was established by 1974, setting annual production targets 
(quota) for milk producers in Canada.7 The country’s first national supply management system 
was born and soon poultry would come under its umbrella in the late 1970s. 
7 
According to the Canadian Dairy Commission: “… an Interim Comprehensive Milk Marketing Plan in 1970 and the 
subsequent establishment of the Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee (CMSMC). Ontario, Quebec and the 
federal government were the original parties to this Plan. All remaining provinces except Newfoundland entered the Plan 
by the end of 1974, thus becoming the National Milk Marketing Plan (NMMP).” http://www.cdc-ccl.gc.ca/CDC/index-eng.
php?id=3793.
5The Canadian dairy industry relies on a combination of domestic and trade policies in order 
to protect producers through supply management. At the domestic level, there is administered 
pricing and supply restriction, while internationally there are import restrictions. Together, 
these policies allow targeted, above-market prices to be met and maintained. This affects the 
consumers by allowing some relatively inefficient producers to operate and creates economic 
deadweight losses by diverting resources away from sectors where they could be used more 
efficiently. The effect of dairy supply management on the economy is well documented and, 
on average, Canadian consumers pay more for dairy products compared to their counterparts 
in other developed countries. Canada reportedly has the highest price of milk in the world.8 As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the OECD estimates that under supply management, dairy producers in 
Canada received an average of $2.5 billion per year in support. This was the annual monetary 
value of the gross transfer from consumers to milk producers arising from the policies of 
supply management. 
FIGURE 1 SUPPORT TO MILK PRODUCERS IN CANADA (US$ MILLIONS), 1996–2016
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Source: OECD agricultural support estimates (2017), http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/
producerandconsumersupportestimatesdatabase.htm#country.
As shown in Table 1, the five-year average dairy support in other major dairy-producing 
countries varies from zero in New Zealand to around US$4 billion in both the U.S. and Japan 
during 2010–14. Australian support for milk producers went down from an average of US$300 
million during 1995–99 to less than US$1 million in 2010–14. However, while both the U.S. 
and Japan spend more in total on their dairy industries than Canada does (Table 1), the per 
capita expenditure on dairy is much higher in Canada. In fact, a comparison of the value of 
producer supports relative to total consumer spending is perhaps more informative, given the 
vast difference in production and consumption volumes. If we normalize the value of support to 
the value of consumer spending net of that support, we effectively get the effect of support on 
consumer prices. For Canada, the ratio of support to consumer spending is 98 per cent (in 2016) 
and this is much higher than any other country except South Korea and Japan. The 98 percent 
8 
See this blog by Bev Dahlby: https://www.policyschool.ca/canada-tops-world-rankings-milk-prices/. It cites an Argentine 
news report showing that Canada has the highest prices among 33 countries studied.
6implies that supply management and Canada’s agricultural policies nearly double the cost of 
milk to consumers in Canada. Note also that the share of support to dairy producers in Canada 
accounts for 29 per cent of the total support provided to the entire agriculture sector, whereas 
in the U.S. it accounts for just 13 per cent (Table 2). In Australia and New Zealand, it is zero. 
What is the value of this quota system in Canada? At current market prices, the value of a milk 
quota is about $25,000 per total production quota (TPQ) in most provinces and over $40,000 
in British Columbia. This is roughly the cost of a production quota for a typical dairy cow. As 
there are just under one million dairy cows in Canada, the aggregate value of these quotas is 
somewhere between $25 billion to $30 billion. This is the value of a quota that would be lost 
if supply management were ended tomorrow and is what most producers are worried about. 
For the government to use a temporary levy to repay that lost quota value over the span of, 
say, eight years (as Australia did) would take a consumer levy of roughly 40 cents per litre of 
milk. This will be discussed in more detail below, but helps to illustrate that liberalization can 
benefit consumers, benefit productive producers and be structured in such a way as to mitigate 
potential capital losses to unproductive dairy farmers.
TABLE 1 SUPPORT TO MILK PRODUCERS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 
US$ Million (Five-Year Average)
1995-99 2000-04 2005-2009 2010-14
Australia 372.9 27.7 0.2 0.3
Canada 1456.9 1679.7 2161.3 2538.8
Japan 4392.7 3671.8 3059.9 4322.4
Mexico 417.9 705.8 152.3 29.6
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
United States 9592.0 9015.4 4002.9 4260.8
Source: Authors’ calculations; OECD agricultural support estimates (2015).
TABLE 2 MILK SUPPORT AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AGRICULTURE SUPPORT
Country 1986 1991 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Australia 61% 47% 17% 4% 0% 0% 0%
Canada 70% 67% 49% 64% 49% 52% 29%
New Zealand 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
United States 34% 40% 24% 50% 19% 15% 13%
Source: Authors’ calculations; OECD agricultural support estimates (2015).
THE DAIRY MARKET IN NAFTA: HOW IS THE CANADIAN INDUSTRY POSITIONED?
How does the Canadian dairy industry compare to that in the United States and how does it 
compare to the dairy industries of other countries – specifically the signatories to the TPP 
agreement? Can we learn any lessons from the trade liberalization in dairy that other major 
exporters, such as New Zealand, undertook? As illustrated in Figure 2, Canada produced 
roughly 8.4 million tonnes of milk in 2014. Canadian milk production is small compared to 
the production of its closest trading partner, the U.S., which produced almost 10 times that 
amount the same year. Australia and New Zealand’s milk production was also higher, with 
7New Zealand producing twice the amount produced in Canada.9 Importantly, Canada’s milk 
production exceeded New Zealand’s and Australia’s in the 1980s and this changed in the 
1990s when both the countries’ milk production overtook Canada’s. In 2014, New Zealand 
milk production was 21 million tonnes and Australia’s 9.5 million tonnes. Even Mexico’s milk 
production exceeded Canada’s starting in the late 1990s. The U.S. is the biggest producer of 
milk in the world at 93.5 million tonnes. 
We also witnessed a decline in domestic dairy consumption, with Canadians drinking 
less milk, on average, than they have historically. As presented in Table 3, the per capita 
consumption of milk in Canada decreased from 81.5 litres per year in 2009 to 73.3 litres 
in 2014. However, per capita cheese consumption has remained steady at 12.4 kilograms 
per capita. The same trend is also being seen in the U.S., where the per capita fluid milk 
consumption has fallen from 82.0 litres in 2009 to about 71.6 litres in 2014. In 2014, both 
Australia and New Zealand per capita milk consumption was well above Canada’s. There are 
many plausible reasons for the increased per capita consumption in both countries, however, 
the removal of supply management practices in both countries reduced the retail dairy prices 
and aided the growth of dairy consumption.
FIGURE 2 MILK PRODUCTION IN NAFTA AND AMONG MAJOR DAIRY-EXPORTING COUNTRIES
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As in other sectors of the economy, when the price of a commodity falls, the consumer 
benefits from those falling prices. However, the Canadian consumer has not benefited from 
falling global dairy prices. The price adjustment of a commodity along the supply chain from 
producer to consumer is the hallmark of a competitive market, but there is no pressure on 
domestic Canadian producers to cut dairy prices. As illustrated in Figure 3, trends in global 
dairy prices indicate that they have fallen from their peak in 2014, but the Canadian consumer 
has not benefited. Between 2006 and 2008, demand from developing countries outpaced 
supply, especially in China, which was one of the main reasons for higher dairy prices from 
2003 to 2008.
9 In per capita terms, U.S. and Canadian production is on par since both Canadian production and population are about 
one-tenth U.S. levels. New Zealand dairy production per capita, on the other hand, is much higher as the population of New 
Zealand is about one-eighth that of the Canadian population. 
8TABLE 3 GLOBAL DAIRY CONSUMPTION IN 2014
Milk (Litres per capita) Butter Consumption (Kilograms per capita) Cheese Consumption (Kilograms per capita)
Australia 110.5 4 13.6
Canada 73.3 2.8 12.4
Mexico 29.9 0.4 3.7
New Zealand 108.5 4.8 8.6
United States 71.6 2.5 15.5
Source: Canada Dairy Information Centre.
FIGURE 3 GLOBAL DAIRY PRICE INDEX
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Note: The Dairy Price Index consists of butter, SMP (skim milk powder), WMP (whole milk powder), cheese and casein 
price quotations; the average is weighted by world-average export-trade shares for 2002–04.
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
Milk production across the world is growing and exports are increasing. However, as shown 
in Table 4, Canada’s milk exports amounted to a meagre US$116 million in 2015 and annual 
exports averaged US$160 million from 1995 to 2015. Three countries, New Zealand, the U.S., 
and Australia are the major players in global milk exports. With annual exports of close to 
US$5.3 billion, New Zealand topped the world export market in 2015. The United States is the 
largest dairy producer in the world and the second-largest exporter in the world with U.S. milk 
exports reaching US$2.5 billion in 2014.
Although the U.S. is a big exporter of dairy, it has also been an attractive market for dairy 
imports. As shown in Table 5, the U.S. imported an average of US$500 million worth of dairy 
products from 2010–14. Mexico imported US$1 billion during 2010–14. Canada imported 
US$159 million worth of milk products annually on average during 2010–14. Of course, 
the dairy industry is broader than just milk and does include butter and cheese as well. 
Butter consumption is much smaller in value than milk and cheese consumption, but butter 
9consumption is increasing in many countries. Overall, world exports of butter products more 
than doubled from US$4 billion in 1995 to US$8.3 billion in 2014. In 2014, New Zealand 
was the largest exporter of butter in the world and exported US$2.1 billion worth of butter. 
Canadian exports stood at US$6 million in 2014; even Mexico exports more than Canada. 
TABLE 4  MILK EXPORTS FROM NAFTA AND MAJOR DAIRY-PRODUCING COUNTRIES 
(FIGURES ROUNDED IN US$ MILLION)
Australia Canada Mexico New Zealand United States
1995 654 133 9 906 467
1996 844 163 16 1,195 343
1997 786 157 26 1,217 464
1998 743 143 27 1,038 456
1999 773 138 44 985 438
2000 879 111 46 1,122 506
2001 915 180 49 1,636 534
2002 935 143 43 1,385 434
2003 742 159 49 1,660 480
2004 960 127 44 1,992 815
2005 1,056 133 67 2,243 939
2006 1,047 170 58 2,544 1,084
2007 1,140 194 58 3,707 1,764
2008 1,297 183 73 4,242 2,205
2009 949 160 65 3,257 1,148
2010 1,078 172 87 4,789 2,030
2011 1,250 225 102 6,391 2,553
2012 1,278 204 96 6,495 2,584
2013 1,262 180 104 8,062 3,599
2014 1,412 187 109 8,670 3,740
2015 1,016 116 92 5,307 2,540
Source: UNCTAD Merchandise Trade Statistic Database.
TABLE 5 MILK IMPORTS FOR NAFTA AND MAJOR DAIRY-PRODUCING COUNTRIES
US$ million (five-year average)
1995-99 2000-04 2005-2009 2010-14
Australia 39 47 98 193
Canada 56 106 148 159
Mexico 381 474 842 1,060
New Zealand 16 20 49 107
United States 136 234 390 496
NAFTA 573 814 1,380 1,715
TPP 1,619 1,897 3,231 4,566
World 15,385 17,101 29,434 44,913
Source: UNCTAD Merchandise Trade Statistic Database
10
With the standard of living improving in many countries, cheese consumption is increasing. 
Cheese imports worldwide increased from US$11 billion in 1995 to US$32 billion in 2014. 
The largest importer of cheese was the U.S. In 2014, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. 
maintained a cheese trade surplus. Over the last 20 years, New Zealand cheese exports 
increased by US$1 billion and, during the same period, Canadian cheese exports increased by 
US$200 million. Comparing New Zealand cheese exports with Canada, New Zealand sold five 
times more than Canada did in the international market.
THE DAIRY INDUSTRY BENEFITED FROM ENDING SUPPLY MANAGEMENT IN 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
Both Australia and New Zealand had supply management systems for their dairy industries 
in the past. The supply management practices came into force to support the excess supply of 
dairy products in both countries.
In Australia, the domestic “market support system” allowed the dairy industry to be one of its 
most highly regulated and protected industries for almost 80 years, until it was dismantled in 
2001. While in Canada the focus of supply management is on industrial milk, in Australia it 
was the fluid milk, or “market milk,” that was regulated and thus provided the most lucrative 
premiums for dairy farmers. Each of Australia’s six states had its own milk marketing board, 
not unlike the provincial dairy marketing boards in Canada. (Edwards, 2003) Eventually, amid 
a steady process of small but significant reforms and a growing sentiment among producers, 
processors and consumers that deregulation was inevitable, Australia deregulated its dairy 
industry in 2000. The Australian government proceeded with deregulation and a package of 
adjustment, exit and support payments funded by a relatively small retail tax on milk sales (11 
cents per litre for a period of eight years). 
This reform consisted of two programs: the Dairy Structural Adjustment Program (DSAP), 
responsible for adjustment and exit payments, and the Dairy Regional Assistance Program 
(DRAP), responsible for community- and producer-support payments. Through DSAP, $1.6 
billion in payments (all figures being used here are in Australian dollars) averaging $143,000 
and $72,000 in quarterly instalments were made to farmers respectively and exit payments 
of up to $45,000 were made to farmers who chose to leave the industry. (Edwards, 2003) 
Through DRAP, $185 million in support payments were made to communities and farmers 
that were adversely affected by deregulation. (Edwards, 2003) These exit payments were 
offered to producers who could no longer competitively operate in the industry without  
some compensation. 
In New Zealand, the reforms were initiated in the 1980s, much earlier than in Australia. 
Surprisingly, farmers were among the first to propose reform. In 1982, the Federated Farmers 
of New Zealand (FFNZ), which was the country’s main farming organization, submitted an 
economic position paper to the government. The paper proposed that one of the main causes 
of inflation was the consistent budget deficit accrued by funding farm subsidies and that the 
priority should be controlling inflation, as opposed to compensating farmers for the results 
of inflation. In 1984, virtually all subsidies and export support systems for agriculture were 
dismantled. By the 1990s, after the six-year transition period, subsidies to the dairy industry 
were phased out.
11
As Australian and New Zealand dairy industries became more efficient, they also became 
more internationally competitive. From 1990 to 2002, the period where reforms were 
being implemented to phase out support, Australian and New Zealand exports experienced 
phenomenal growth. Australian milk exports increased from US$650 million in 1990 to US$1.4 
billion in 2014 and New Zealand became the world’s largest exporter. In 2014, New Zealand 
exported US$8.67 billion worth of milk. As shown in Table 6, in 1995 New Zealand’s share 
of world milk exports was less than six per cent but increased to 16 per cent in 2014, which 
is a 10-percentage-point increase in the world share in just a few decades. Canadian exports 
comprise less than one per cent of the world market. However, it is important to acknowledge 
the fundamental differences between the dairy industry in New Zealand and those in Australia 
and Canada. Unlike the latter two, dairy in New Zealand has always been driven by exports, 
and the industry was accustomed to international market pressures long before it was protected. 
Another important difference is that while Australia had, and Canada still has, some form of 
domestic supply management, New Zealand had no accumulated value for production quotas, 
so deregulation of the market was a significantly simpler process. This is evident from the 
speed and ease with which the support system was both implemented and dismantled. 
TABLE 6 MAJOR PRODUCER SHARE IN WORLD MARKET, 1995–2014
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Canada 0.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4%
USA 3.0% 3.5% 4.1% 5.8% 7.2%
New Zealand 5.8% 7.8% 9.8% 13.7% 16.7%
Source: Authors’ calculation from UNCTAD Merchandise Trade Statistic Database.
The prolonged success of New Zealand dairy as an export-driven industry can be attributed in 
large part to its reliance on trade liberalization and the benefits these approaches can provide 
when trying to maintain a strong international market presence and capitalize on export 
opportunities. The experience in New Zealand highlights the detrimental effects of export 
subsidies as well as challenges for growth and development of the industry based on supply 
management and import restrictions. The Australian case is more similar to Canada and may 
be more useful when considering how to move forward with deregulation of the dairy industry. 
Certainly, liberalizing international trade in dairy and dismantling supply management will 
lead some dairy producers to exit the market. However, other producers will grow and expand. 
Economic theory and evidence from other liberalization experiences indicate that the least 
productive producers will exit and the most-productive producers will expand. This will yield 
productivity improvements in the dairy industry. Some form of transition program as employed 
in Australia will ease the path to a more competitive and productive dairy industry in Canada.
THE LOST DECADE FOR THE CANADIAN DAIRY PRODUCER AND CONSUMER 
Both Canadian consumers and the dairy industry overall have lost because of the supply 
management practices in Canada. The support to milk producers through market price 
support has kept retail prices high. The trade barriers in the Canadian dairy industry decrease 
consumer purchasing power and insulates them from the benefits of falling global dairy prices.
Many studies have observed the benefits to consumers from dairy trade liberalization and, 
according to the OECD, dairy trade liberalization would reduce the Canadian retail dairy price 
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by 26 per cent, butter prices by 46 per cent, cheese prices by 33 per cent, and milk prices by 
32 per cent. (Zhu, Cox and Chavas, 1999) Trade liberalization would not only reduce domestic 
milk prices but the industry will become more competitive and milk production and supply 
would increase by seven to 12 per cent, (Larivière and Meilke, 1999) and some of this increased 
supply could be exported.
If dairy policy reforms are initiated, consumption of milk and dairy products will increase in 
response to lower retail prices. In the coming years, the OECD estimates that there will be an 
increase of 23.2 per cent in the global consumption of fresh dairy products. The OECD also 
points out that, as sugar prices in Canada are among the lowest in the world, Canada will enjoy 
a significant competitive advantage in the international ice cream market.10 
Canada’s advantage from its experience in agriculture in general and the dairy industry should 
have been a magnet for attracting investments in the dairy industry. Yet, it is dairy exporters 
from other countries that have attracted huge investments. As shown in Table 7, during the last 
12 years the U.S. attracted US$2.8 billion in investment in its dairy industry. Canada’s ability 
to attract investment was dismal, attracting just US$126 million in the last 12 years. Major 
dairy exporting countries had varying degrees of success in attracting inbound greenfield 
investment (GFI). Not surprisingly, New Zealand attracted more than US$800 million during 
the years 2009–15 and Mexico attracted more than US$1 billion to its dairy sector 
The Canadian dairy industry has been able to integrate the supply management practices in 
its cost structure, both at producer and processing levels. Because of this, the dairy industry 
has failed to attract investments. By maintaining supply management, the dairy industry has 
suffered a twin blow. First, the consumption of dairy products has decreased in Canada and 
second the industry has failed to attract foreign investment.
TABLE 7 GREENFIELD INVESTMENT IN THE DAIRY INDUSTRY IN TPP COUNTRIES (FIGURES IN USD MILLION)
2003–08 2009–15
United States 693.10 (10.5%)
2232.80
(15.4%)
Mexico 146.29(2.2%)
1027.86
(7.1%)
New Zealand 50.4(0.8%)
814.52
(5.6%)
Australia 63.40(1%)
339.05
(2.3%)
Canada 37.7(0.6%)
89.00
(0.6%)
Source: FT FDI Market, 2016.
CONSEQUENCES OF RENEGOTIATED NAFTA FOR THE CANADIAN DAIRY INDUSTRY 
NAFTA is a 27-year-old agreement between the U.S., Canada and Mexico that came into effect 
on Jan. 1, 1994. The agreement runs to 2,000 pages and has eight sections, which include 22 
chapters. The important provisions include market access for exporters, protection for foreign 
investment and intellectual property, rules-of-origin and trade-dispute mechanisms, and labour 
10 
The data are calculated by OECD using the Aglink, a partial equilibrium dynamic supply-demand model. The dairy 
component of this model covers production and consumption of milk and dairy products. OECD, “An analysis of dairy 
policy reforms and trade liberalization” (OECD: 2004).
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mobility for certain professions through different types of visas. For example, TN-1 visas allow 
private companies to provide workers for government contracts. Also, goods made within 
NAFTA countries may be eligible for duty-free treatment or a reduced duty rate.11 
The dairy sector’s exemption from the NAFTA agreement helped to maintain supply 
management practices in Canada. The U.S. dairy industry has always complained about 
the lack of access to Canadian markets. In 2017, three major organizations representing the 
U.S. dairy industry appealed to the Trump administration to take action against Canada’s 
protectionist policies.12 
In order to support supply management, Canadian dairy trade policies are geared towards 
protecting the dairy market. The industry is protected through a tariff-rate quota (TRQ). This is 
a two-tariff system, where one relatively small tariff is charged on all imports within the quota 
and then a second, larger, essentially prohibitive tariff is charged on all potential imports that 
would exceed the quota. 
It is unfair to say that only Canada imposes tariffs on the dairy industry, since all major dairy-
exporting countries impose some level of tariff on dairy products. However, Canada has one 
of the highest dairy tariffs among major dairy producers. As shown in Table 8 and Table 9, the 
in-quota tariffs are relatively low (one per cent to 7.5 per cent on average) on a limited volume 
of imports. The low quota volume is unduly restrictive, as demonstrated by the concessions that 
Canada made to increase the quotas under the TPP and CETA agreements. The second piece 
of the two-tariff system is that Canada charges prohibitive tariffs on any imports exceeding the 
quota limits. Canada applies an astonishingly high average tariff of 250 per cent on over-quota 
dairy imports, compared to the 17-per-cent average tariff in the U.S. and 27-per-cent average in 
Mexico. Australia, one of the largest exporters of dairy products, applies a three-per-cent tariff 
to dairy products and New Zealand applies a 1.5-per-cent tariff. 
Dairy industry reforms are a contentious issue. Dairy product trade accounts for less than 10 
per cent of global milk production, but trade in dairy product is highly volatile, with prices 
fluctuating significantly in the last decade. As discussed earlier, there are only a few big 
exporters around the world and they have a big share of the market. Also, in the dairy industry, 
similar to other goods and services, countries both export and import dairy products. 
TABLE 8 CANADIAN DAIRY TARIFF-RATE QUOTA (TRQ) VOLUMES AND TARIFF RATES IN 2015
Import TRQ (000 kg) In-Quota Tariff (%) Over-Quota Tariff (%)
Cheese 20,411.9 1.0 245.6
Butter 3274.0 7.5 298.7
Skim Milk Powder (SMP) 4345.0 6.5 201.5
Ice Cream 484.0 6.5 243.4
Yogurt 332.0 6.5 237.5
Source: WTO, Tariff Analysis Online: Bounded — Tariff Quotas, 2015.
11 For more details see Eugene Beaulieu, “Has North American integration resulted in Canada becoming too dependent on the 
United States?” Policy Options 28 (2007): 97-102.
12 
“Dairy groups urge Trump to target Canada’s ‘protectionist’ policies that violate NAFTA rules,” Financial Post, January 
12, 2017, http://business.financialpost.com/news/retail-marketing/u-s-dairy-groups-urge-trump-to-target-canadas-
protectionist-policies-that-violate-nafta-rules.
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TABLE 9  MOST-FAVOURED-NATION (MFN) TARIFF FOR DAIRY PRODUCTS IN NAFTA AND AMONG MAJOR 
DAIRY-EXPORTING COUNTRIES IN 2015
Simple Average Applied MFN Tariff
All Products Dairy Products
Australia 2.72 3.38
Canada 4.17 248.95
Mexico 7.52 27.04
New Zealand 2.04 1.35
United States 3.51 17.18
Note: “In current usage Most-Favored Nation Tariffs (MFN) tariffs are what countries promise to impose on imports 
from other members of the WTO, unless the country is part of a preferential trade agreement (such as a free trade area 
or customs union). This means that, in practice, MFN rates are the highest (most restrictive) that WTO members charge 
one another.” 
Source: World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).
As mentioned earlier, the dairy industry was excluded from the free-trade agreement between 
Canada and the U.S. NAFTA renegotiations over the dairy industry would likely include 
discussing market access for U.S. dairy producers through a reduction in the dairy trade 
tariff and quota as well as non-tariff barriers such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
concerning health, safety and environmental standards and rules of origin. Of the most concern 
to the Canadian dairy industry will be the increased market access for U.S. dairy producers. 
The impact of a renegotiated NAFTA for Canadian dairy producers and consumers will depend 
on three factors:
First, the nature of changes in the dairy industry trade between countries in NAFTA. The U.S. 
already exports fresh milk and cream to Canada. Figure 4 illustrates that the intra trade (trade 
among NAFTA members) in the dairy industry was approximately US$1.5 billion, which is less 
than one per cent of total trade under NAFTA. Most of the dairy trade happens between U.S. 
and Mexico and is worth more than approximately US$1.2 billion, while bilateral dairy trade 
between the U.S. and Canada is approximately US$300 million. 
Second, how the domestic food sector in Canada responds to greater access to U.S. dairy inputs 
for production and processing. The provincial milk-marketing boards set the quotas for milk 
and other regulations regarding prices and production. The personal-use milk-import quota 
is set at 65,000 metric tonnes, however since there is no commercial quota available for milk, 
most of the importing is done through the personal-use quota. Some companies import milk 
under the commercial quota, which requires that milk imports be used as input for re-exported 
products. As illustrated in Figure 5, in 2015 Canada imported US$200 million of dairy products 
from the U.S. and exported US$89 million. In 2014, U.S. dairy product exports stood at US$4.5 
billion, including US$255 million to Canada, accounting for five per cent of total U.S. exports. 
15
FIGURE 4 DAIRY SECTOR INTRA TRADE IN NAFTA COUNTRIES
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FIGURE 5 BILATERAL DAIRY TRADE BETWEEN CANADA AND U.S. 
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Third, the kind of incentive the government provides to Canadian dairy producers in the 
two major milk-producing provinces. The negative impact on the politically sensitive dairy 
producers primarily in southern Ontario and Quebec has left the high level of industry 
protection untouched for decades. As shown in Figure 6, the combined share of Ontario 
and Quebec provincial milk production accounted for approximately 70 per cent of national 
production and the shares have not changed very much over time. 
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FIGURE 6 PERCENTAGE SHARE BY PROVINCE OF CANADA’S FARM MILK PRODUCTION
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In its recent trade deals, the TPP and CETA, Canada gave limited market access to its dairy 
industry. In the case of the recent TPP negotiations, Canada agreed to increase foreign access to 
its dairy market by an estimated 3.25 per cent of its yearly milk production. As compensation to 
domestic dairy producers, the Canadian government would pay $2.4 billion in income support 
and $1.5 billion to maintain the value of production quotas over the course of 15 years. In 
addition, $450 million would be paid to producers to aid with upgrading production facilities.
Under the CETA agreement with the European Union, EU milk exports to Canada will double, 
which represents an increase in foreign access equivalent to two per cent of Canadian domestic 
milk production (i.e., from the equivalent of one per cent of the Canadian market to two per 
cent). EU producers will also have access to the growing Canadian cheese market, with the deal 
allowing access to four per cent of the market to EU exporters. Access to the cheese market 
will increase from 2,667 metric tonnes in year one to 16,000 metric tonnes in year six. The 
Canadian government will pay $350 million as compensation to domestic dairy producers.13
A renegotiation of NAFTA obviously holds promise for Canadian dairy consumers but 
lowering barriers could hurt some Canadian dairy producers. However, we argue that the 
industry overall will thrive and become globally competitive. As documented in the empirical 
analysis of trade reform in the dairy industry and, as we have observed in other Canadian 
industries that liberalized under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and 
NAFTA, relatively inefficient producers will close shop, but more-productive producers 
will expand and prosper. This transformation of the Canadian manufacturing industry has 
been carefully studied and analyzed by Trefler (2004). Economic theory predicts that trade 
liberalization will lead to exit from the industry by the least productive firms and expansion by 
the most-productive firms. This transformation yields a more productive industry overall. So, 
we would expect to see some dislocation in the industry as inefficient firms close and long-run 
efficiency gains as the industry adjusts and more-efficient firms emerge in a more competitive 
environment. Trefler (2004) found that this transformation occurred in the Canadian 
13 
Janyce McGregor, “$350M dairy programs to help farmers, processors compete under Canada-EU trade deal,” CBC News 
(November 10, 2016), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/dairy-compensation-announcement-ceta-thursday-1.3845003.
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manufacturing industry after implementing CUSFTA. Trefler found the short-run cost, as firms 
closed and employment in industries affected by free trade declined by 15 per cent. In the long-
run, the industries affected by free trade experienced a very large productivity gain of 17 per 
cent, or one per cent per year. Head and Ries also found evidence of a similar adjustment in 
Canadian manufacturing consistent with economic theory.
Although there is no guarantee that the Canadian dairy industry will adjust similarly, 
theory and evidence suggest that this is the case. First, some of the manufacturing industries 
studied were in food-related products and there is no reason to believe that the agri-food 
industry will not adjust in a similar fashion. Second, the evidence from Slade and Hailu 
(2016) provides direct evidence that a more competitive market structure in the U.S. explains 
better productivity among American dairy producers than with Canadian producers. Third, 
as we observed in New Zealand and Australia, liberalizing the dairy industry can lead to 
a transformed dairy sector that can become a world leader as the industry transforms, as 
economic theory and evidence suggest. 
With the renegotiation of NAFTA, we see the liberalization of dairy that Canada agreed to 
under TPP as an opportunity and an occasion for Canada to step up and do the right thing. 
The prospect of eliminating supply management in Canada has become a daunting political 
challenge and no political party in Canada has been able to move forward with it, even though 
Canadian consumers would benefit from such a policy change. However, renegotiating NAFTA 
is a tremendous opportunity to reduce trade barriers in the industry and to give the Americans 
something they want in the negotiations. In fact, supply management has been identified as one 
of the key goals of the American negotiation team. Failure to offer some movement on supply 
management could result in the failure of the negotiations. Moving on supply management, as 
was done in TPP negotiations, can provide the negotiators with something to offer. Although 
it is politically difficult to move on supply management, it would be good for Canadian 
consumers and could lead to a more productive dairy industry in Canada. The status quo could 
jeopardize negotiations. At the same time, it is an opportunity to weaken supply management 
and move toward dismantling it altogether.
POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF LIBERALIZATION AND AREAS NEEDING 
FURTHER RESEARCH
It is important to acknowledge that there are many layers to this problem and that the negative 
impacts of liberalizing dairy trade and dismantling dairy supply management warrant further 
consideration. In the following paragraphs we briefly address some of these concerns and 
highlight some potential unexpected consequences that require a closer look and further research.
Although basic economic theory suggests a clear relationship between dairy trade liberalization, 
domestic deregulation and lower domestic dairy prices for Canadian consumers, this may be an 
oversimplification. Dairy processors and food retailers base their prices not just on the cost of 
inputs, but also on the demographics and socioeconomic characteristics of their surroundings.14 
It is therefore unrealistic to assume that a decrease in dairy prices would be completely passed 
on to consumers in the short run. Processors and retailers would continue to sell at almost the 
14 
Maurice Doyon, “Simple solutions don’t apply to supply management,” National Post (September 25, 2013),  
http://nationalpost.com/opinion/maurice-doyon-supply-management-supports-local-farmers/wcm/fcdfafeb-3ae3-400c-
b785-ce57881c0a6c.
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same price as before deregulation, until their customers went elsewhere. However, economic 
theory also suggests that in the long run, as new processing and retailing firms enter the market 
in response to the relatively higher profits being accrued by existing ones, competition will 
increase and the prices faced by consumers will eventually fall. Just how much of these savings 
would be passed onto consumers in the long run would require further economic analysis.
It is also clear that policies like dairy supply management transfers money away from non-
agricultural regions towards agricultural ones. However, what is not clear is the impact that 
stopping these de facto transfer payments would have on the livelihoods and well-being of 
their current recipients. Many dairy-intensive regions may be dependent in large part on the 
revenues generated from dairy farming. These revenues are then reinvested, at least in part, 
within the region by those dairy producers, generating a second round of economic activity and 
wealth for the region, which then gets reinvested, and so forth. Since it is likely that some of 
these dairy producers would no longer be able to compete after deregulation, it is possible that 
some rural communities may be severely affected by the dismantling of supply management 
and the liberalization of dairy trade. Although evidence from Australia and New Zealand 
suggests that relatively few producers would exit the industry and economic theory suggests 
that the industry will transform in the long run due to deregulation, we do not currently know 
how many dairy producers will exit the industry and we do not know how many will actually 
reinvest in their respective regions. Before any truly accurate estimates can be made about 
the negative effects of dismantling supply management and liberalizing dairy trade, these 
unknowns must be addressed. However, we do know that current producers will be negatively 
impacted by liberalizing the industry and through the adjustment period as the industry 
transforms to a more competitive environment. For these reasons, programs to compensate 
those negatively impacted and programs to help in managing the adjustment to the new 
regulatory framework will be required.
Lastly, while it may be easy to consider differences between the economic landscapes at the 
time of deregulation in New Zealand and Australia and the current economic landscape in 
Canada, we must also consider differences in their physical landscapes. Aside from obvious 
climatic differences that could possibly explain some of New Zealand and Australia’s success 
after deregulation and dampen expectations of our own, it is also important to recognize that 
efficiency may differ due to differences in soil and pastures, availability of different feed types 
and even differing levels and types of diseases and parasites; raw, unadjusted differences in 
efficiency between Australian and New Zealand producers and Canadian ones may not tell 
the whole story. However, as evidence from Slade and Hailu (2016) indicate, Ontario dairy 
producers are similar to New York dairy producers except for the regulatory environment 
that limits competition in Ontario and lowers its productivity. Therefore, it is likely that the 
Canadian dairy market would become more efficient after deregulation and, regardless of 
physical, topographical, or climatic differences, Canada would at the very least have the 
potential to increase its share of the international dairy market. 
CONCLUSIONS
President Trump after announcing the new tariff for steel and aluminum tweeted the U.S. 
farmers are treated unfairly. The tweet was a subtle reference to the supply management 
practices in the Canadian dairy sector. There is no denying the fact this is a contentious issue 
in the current NAFTA renegotiations. The dairy sector can be the major stumbling block in the 
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renegotiations. However, NAFTA renegotiations present an opportunity to dismantle supply 
management practices in the Canadian dairy industry. While some producers will suffer in the 
short run, the industry as a whole will become more productive in the long run and Canadian 
consumers will gain. 
 
While the costs of supply management and its accompanying trade policies are undeniable, it 
is also clear that the liberalization of the dairy industry would result in significant adjustment 
for producers in the short run. Therefore, any exit strategy from supply management has to 
be carefully planned and the adjustment process should be phased in. Further research can 
guide the adjustment process and policy to allow the industry to adjust to a new competitive 
environment. Due to the protected environment that supply management and its requisite 
trade policies afford dairy producers in Canada, the single most valuable investment in a 
dairy producer’s life may actually be the production quota itself. This means that abruptly 
dismantling the system without adjustment packages or compensation to producers could be 
devastating and there must be some opportunity for producers to prepare for the realities of 
an open market. The aim should be to offer a grace period in order to modernize production 
methods and facilities, increasing productivity and efficiency so that, ultimately, the more 
efficient producers can remain competitive once the protection is removed. The first step would 
be a gradual dissolution of supply management and the trade policies that exist in order to 
keep it afloat. Australia’s success using tax-funded adjustment packages and exit payments is 
undeniable. (Edwards, 2003)
Perhaps there is a public perception that the dairy industry and all agricultural industries are 
an integral part of the socioeconomic fabric of Canadian society and are therefore entitled to 
protection from the realities of the modern market. Or, there might simply be a collective-
action problem where consumers, of whom there are many, cannot co-ordinate themselves as 
effectively as can dairy producers, of whom there are relatively few. These two theories are not 
mutually exclusive. The capacity to co-ordinate so effectively allows producers to successfully 
lobby for continued protection, while the premiums generated by this protection affords them 
the financial means to perpetuate that public perception.
While Australia’s political and economic climate at the time of its system’s dismantling differs 
from Canada’s, the Australian experience still provides valuable evidence that these sector-
specific support systems can be eliminated even after producers have long grown accustomed 
to their benefits. Australia’s dairy industry is thriving and production has since become more 
efficient by concentrating on larger farms in lower-cost production areas. Its experiment with 
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supply management also provides us with evidence that a combination of exit payments and 
adjustment packages may provide the necessary framework required for a smooth transition 
to an unprotected dairy industry in Canada. Also, while the export subsidies that New 
Zealand briefly adopted are very different from the Australian or Canadian system of supply 
management, we can learn from its ability to dismantle its support system in just six years as it 
continues to succeed as an export-focused industry. 
The evidence from Canada’s adjustment to CUSFTA and NAFTA are clear. The least efficient 
plants will likely close when faced with increased competition. The most-efficient plants will 
expand and capture larger market shares. This will lead to productivity gains in the sector and 
yield a globally competitive and innovative dairy sector in Canada. Meanwhile, consumers 
gain from this policy change.
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RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TRENDS: THE INVISIBLE COST OF PIPELINE CONSTRAINTS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ENERGY-trends-advisory-March.pdf
G. Kent Fellows | March 2018
FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: HOW THE COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH HAS FAILED CALGARY’S CHRONICALLY HOMELESS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Falling-Through-The-Cracks-Milaney-FINAL-2Williams-Dutton-final.pdf
Katrina Milaney, Nicole Williams and Daniel Dutton | February 2018
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN FEMALE EMPLOYMENT RATES
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Social-Trends-International-EM-Rates-February-2018.pdf
Margarita Gres Wilkins and Ronald Kneebone | February 2018
THE TIME HAS COME TO REVISIT SOLVENCY FUNDING RULES
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Solvency-Funding-Nielson.pdf
Norma Nielson | February 2018
2017 TAX COMPETITIVENESS REPORT: THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2017-Tax-Competitiveness-Bazel-Mintz-Thompson-final.pdf
Philip Bazel, Jack Mintz and Austin Thompson | February 2018
RECENT CHANGES TO PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET REPORTING IN ALBERTA
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/AB-Budget-Reporting-Kneebone-Wilkins.pdf
Ronald Kneebone and Margarita Gres Wilkins | February 2018
HAS THE CITY-RURAL TAX BASE AND LAND-USE BALANCE CHANGED IN ALBERTA? EXPLORATIONS INTO THE DISTRIBUTION OF EQUALIZED PROPERTY 
ASSESSMENTS AMONG MUNICIPALITY CLASSES
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Final_City-Rural-Tax-Base-McMillan.pdf
Melville McMillan | February 2018
REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN TRANSPORT: ALL IN ONE BASKET?
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/GHG-Emissions-Rivers-Wigle.pdf
Nicholas Rivers and Randall Wigle | February 2018
CANADA AND ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP IN THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE: AN IMPORTANT PART OF A GLOBAL TRADE STRATEGY
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Pacific-Alliance-Stephens-Navarro-Jan2018.pdf
Hugh Stephens and Juan Navarro | January 2018
ALBERTA’S CHANGING INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR OUTPUT AND INCOME VOLATILITY
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/AB-Industrial-Structure-Dahlby-Khanal.pdf
Bev Dahlby and Mukesh Khanal | January 2018
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: THE ENERGY BOOM AND INCOME
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Social-Trends-Deciles-January-Final.pdf
Margarita Gres Wilkins and Ronald Kneebone | January 2018
POLICY BRIEF – WHY IS UPTAKE OF THE DISABILITY TAX CREDIT LOW IN CANADA? EXPLORING POSSIBLE BARRIERS TO ACCESS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Disability-Tax-Credit-Dunn-Zwicker.pdf
Stephanie Dunn and Jennifer Zwicker | January 2018
BUSINESS SUBSIDIES IN CANADA: COMPREHENSIVE ESTIMATES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AND THE FOUR LARGEST PROVINCES
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Business-Subsidies-in-Canada-Lester.pdf
John Lester | January 2018
